CA YOGESH GUPTA
(Sr. Associate Analyst – ICRA
Limited)
Dear
Optimist, Pessimist and Realist. While you guys were arguing about the glass of
water, I drank it.
-Opportunist
Funny,
isn’t it? While the Law Makers, Judiciary and we, the people, were busy arguing
about the pathetic state of law and order in the country the banks seem to have
sighted the opportunity in adversity and made a killing. Read on…
India
has a very sophisticated and well-developed equity market -- comparable with
the best in the world; however, the debt markets (Debt market refers to the financial market where investors buy
and sell debt securities, mostly in the form of bonds) in India remain underdeveloped. In fact, the
secondary debt market in India is practically non-existent.
Reasons for Failure
Why
has the debt market failed to develop in India?
Debt
markets deal with fixed income securities that offer defined payoffs to
investors over a defined time period. The risks inherent in debt markets are of
two kinds -- credit risk or default risk and interest rate risk or duration
risk.
Interest
rate risk arises from changes in the opportunity cost of capital among various
market participants between the time a fixed income security is issued and the
time it is completely paid off. This is a risk that originates in the hands of
the holder of the security (for the most part). If a country has an efficiently
functioning market system, where trades are settled and where the clearing
system ensures protection from default by individual market participants, this
risk is handled well by the marketplace.
We
do have a well-functioning government bond and securities market, primarily
because it carries no credit risk and only carries interest rate risk (The
Indian government routinely runs budget deficits of 3% to 5% and the shortfall
is met through borrowing in the domestic government securities market). But, the
corporate debt market (even for the highest rated corporates) has failed to
take off. The reason the market has failed to take off has very little to do
with the availability of capital or the existence of securities and market
instruments. It has more to do with the feeble legal system in India and non-existence
of strong bankruptcy, insolvency and receivership laws messed up further with
sloppy implementation.
The
corporate debt market deals with credit risk in addition to interest rate risk
and it is in the case of the former that India is found wanting. What is the remedy?
Scenario in the U.S.
In
a developed market like the U.S., if a company is unable to meet its debt
obligations, it has to file for bankruptcy where all the equity is written down
and where the residual
assets are either liquidated or reorganized and allocated to different claims
(societal, employee, crown and private debts) in their order of seniority. Although the process can be laborious, lengthy and prone to high accounting
and legal fees, it works and follows the rule of law.
This
is not the case in a market like India which is victim to orchestrated
defaults/restructuring by corporates.
FCCB Shining!
During
the 2006-07 frenzy, an interesting market called the foreign currency
convertible bond (FCCB) market developed for Indian companies. These were bonds
issued in foreign currency by Indian companies and sold offshore with embedded
options for conversion to equity at predetermined premiums. In the go-go bull
market of the time, investors lapped them up. For issuing companies, the
benefit of lower interest rates on current debt with the potential conversion
at a premium to equity at a future date seemed too good to let -go. FCCBs
worth billions of dollars were issued by several Indian companies and absorbed
by foreign investors.
As
we know, the story got very interesting with the financial market collapse of
2008-2009. The financial market collapse of 2008-09 brought an
unfortunate twist to the story and
to the fate of the investors.
Stock values plummeted deep out of the money (in reference to the convertible option prices on the FCCBs) and the prices of the bonds themselves lost more than half their value.
Stock values plummeted deep out of the money (in reference to the convertible option prices on the FCCBs) and the prices of the bonds themselves lost more than half their value.
During
all of 2009, investors in the FCCB market remained in a state of panic. They
eagerly negotiated settlements with issuing companies and many of the bonds
were redeemed by companies (or bought back) at 50 to 60 cents on the dollar.
The
problem is that Indian law and Indian courts do not accord sufficient sanctity
to a private debt held by a private (non-bank) entity. The laws in India are
enforced to almost exclusively protect the interest of banks that lend to
private entities secured against collateral. In fact, until the securitization
of collateral (SARFESI – Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest) act was passed in 2002, even a bank had
to struggle through years of litigation before being able to enforce foreclosure
on collateral offered against a defaulted loan. With the enactment of SARFESI,
lenders secured by collateral (limited only to banks and recognized domestic
financial institutions) could enforce their security interest on a defaulted
loan without going through the judicial system.
How
does the existence of a vibrant debt market benefit the U.S. economy and how
does it harm the Indian economy? The entire Indian economy is dominated by the
commercial banking system. The banking industry is dominated by government-owned
banks (for a change!), which although very well run, are effective oligopolies.
India
is one of the few places left in the world where banks are able to earn net
interest spreads of 3% to 4% on their loan books and are extremely profitable
in their plain vanilla ‘deposit accepting - loan making’ business.
Taking a Toll
This
has a huge toll on Indian companies (borrowers) and significantly reduces the
efficiency of the economy along with high levels of systemic risk. With the
exception of the 50 largest corporations in India that are large enough to be
rated externally and borrow in foreign currency internationally, all Indian
companies are dependent on the banking system for their debt financing
requirements.
While Debt markets in India suffer from chronic
neglect on the part of policy makers, despite the fact that there is clear
evidence of fairly strong debt preference among households for their financial
investment portfolio, the
U.S. debt markets allocate capital very effectively and creditworthy borrowers
are able to raise debt resources on very competitive terms. Even
non-creditworthy and high-risk borrowers are able to raise resources (albeit at
high cost) to enable them to undertake their high risk ventures (some of which
eventually turn out to be among Fortune 500).
The developed and deep financial markets are therefore a
vital asset to the U.S. economy. Unless the government in India is able to put
in place the structural changes required to its legal and regulatory systems
and ensure their effective implementation, its debt (and hence capital) markets
will remain underdeveloped, placing its corporations at a disadvantage to those
dwelling in economies with developed capital markets.
(All views expressed above does not belong to the Pro Edge 111 team, & are solely the opinion of the author)
(All views expressed above does not belong to the Pro Edge 111 team, & are solely the opinion of the author)





